“Hyperinflation accompanied by a housing collapse is simply impossible—by definition.”
—None-too-clever financial blogger.
Most people in the advanced economies—including most economists—really don’t have any idea what inflation and hyperinflation is. They don’t have a clue because they haven’t lived through it, or were children when it happened in the States and in Europe during the Seventies.
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Wrong metaphor. |
They think it’s nothing more complicated than a rise in prices that ripples through the economy—like a spectator in a football stadium who stands up, obliging the people sitting behind him to also stand up, so that they too can see the action on the pitch, which in turn forces the people behind
them to stand up too, until finally, the whole stadium is up on its feet.
That’s what these people seem to think: Inflation—and the more severe hyperinflation—affects all goods and services and asset classes equally, in a rippling effect. Sort of like a rising tide.
Because of this very foolish fallacy, many economists and interested observers think that
real assets—commodities, land, buildings, factories & machinery—all rise in price equally during an inflationary spell, whereas financial assets—bonds, stocks—uniformly fall.
But this is wrong: It is at best sloppy thinking, at worst dangerously stupid.
Inflation—and hyperinflation—affects two things immediately: Near-term necessities (such as food and fuel), and credit.
The effects on basic necessities is obvious—but the effects on credit are more subtle and complex.
How does inflation and hyperinflation affect credit? By driving up interest rates—obviously. But what is the effects of rising interest rates in an inflationary/hyperinflationary environment?
Real estate price collapse.
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